

MEMO FOR RECORD

RE: FAA OPS CENTER VISIT 2/6/2003
Prepared by: John Raidt
Date of visit: 2/4/2003

(SEE ATTACHED PARTICIPANT ROSTER)

Meeting began approx. 1:00 pm.

--FAA now doing a chronology of events/actions for Mineta's CoS: Flaherty

--No tape or video in Ops Center on 9-11.

--No butcher block paper in the FAA Ops Center for note taking as previously thought. Butcher block paper was in an ad hoc workplace called the Security Directive Working Room in the FAA bldg. third floor
(NOTE: FAA will provide list of people in both the FAA Ops Center and the Sec. Dir. Working Room).

--Ops Center (a.k.a.) Washington Operations Complex (WOC) is linked to the nine regional operations center.

--The ACC (aviation control center)—used solely for aviation hijackings.

--FAA is now tied 24 hours a day by telephone to local law enforcement.

--Shirley Miller and Belger were in the WOC the entire time.

--Garvey wasn't in the building when the events first started to unfold.

--Various centers activated on 9-11 Commission

- *FAA Ops Center
- *Security Directive Working Room
- *9 Regional Office Ops Centers
- *Command Center in Herndon facility
- *DoT Crisis Management Center

FAA PARTICIPANTS: NAME	CURRENT JOB	9/11 JOB
Lindy Knapp	Dep. Gen. Counsel and FAA/DoT liaison to Commission	
Mike Morse		Special Assist ot ACS operations
Shirley Miller		Assistant to Belger
Lynne Osmus		
Linda Schuessler		Herndon Center
Anthony Ferrante		ATC investigator
J. David Canoles		ATC investigator
Mae Avery	Manager of Ops. Center	Manager of Ops. Center
Peter Lynch		
Doug Gould	FAA Lab/Radar interpretation technician	

--Process for alerting system to trouble: ATC notifies SUPERVISOR; SUPERVISOR notifies REGIONAL OPS CENTER; REGIONAL OPS CENTER notifies FAA WASHINGTON OPERATIONS COMPLEX.

--The 9-11 "Phone Bridge" was set up by FAA.

--There were two phone "NETS:" Primary Net: Linked everyone that was vital.
Secondary Net: FAA Internal phone link.

--FAA reports that most of the information about what happened that day was transferred to TSA.

--FAA reports that there was NO recording of the Phone Bridge.
(NOTE: Ken Mead says he heard in a meeting with the Sec./CoS Flaherty/Staff that there was a recording and that it was sent to DoJ).

--ACC is now staffed 24 hours a day.

--New England/Eastern/Great Lakes: Regional office that joined in the 9-11 Net.

--Air Force Col. Adkins – Military liaison to the FAA on 9-11 and currently
(NOTE: Put on Interview list) Adkins arrived about an hour after FAA stood up for the crisis.

--Herndon Center manages the overall NAS—National Air Space.

--Two FAA centers thought they might be targeted and sought to evacuate, including Pittsburgh. The evacuation order was countermanded.

--Shirley Miller was with Monte Belger and Jane Garvey all day on 9-11.

--Boston Center is located in Nashua, NH

--ATC radio contacts: There is no way to know if a transmission is coming from a particular aircraft, unless the individual transmitting declares who they are.

--FAA said that Boston Center declared a hijacking in progress at 8:25 am at which time FAA headquarters is notified.

--Someone in the meeting mentioned a "Domestic Event Network"

--Prior to 9-11 there were no procedures for contacting NORAD even if a hijacking is declared; no transponder; no radio contact; course deviation.

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--First call to NORAD was from Boston Center to OTIS AFB between 8:30-8:34 a.m. The supervisor was being "entrepreneurial."

--It was the National Military Command Centers (NMCC) responsibility to contact NORAD to provide surveillance NOT INTERDICTION.
(NOTE: Did NMCC contact NORAD? How and when?)

--Controller in NY Center received a message for UAL 175 saying they heard a suspicious transmission from AA11. FAA says the controller notified the supervisor (NOTE: Get the time of this exchange and confirm the time/actions of the controller and supervisor).

--Air Transport Association (ATA) has people permanently stationed at the various Operations Centers.
(NOTE: Get all communications between these individuals and ATA re: 9-11).

--8:51 a.m. still normal communications between ATC and AA 77.

--There are two discrete communication systems on board commercial flights
1) Radio contact between Airplanes and FAA (as well as other aircraft) 2) Text message system between the Airline's Flight Ops Center and the aircraft)

(NOTE: Get all communications between the AIRLINE and the AIRCRAFT for 9-11)

--FAA was told by a sheriff that 77 had crashed in Kentucky which was why they weren't looking for the flight.

--There are two ATC radar signatures for a contact: Primary: (which was just a blip/unidentified) and Secondary: (picks up alpha-numeric info from the transponder on the aircraft providing ID/Flight direction/Altitude/Airspeed.

--There was NO DISCUSSION on 9-11 of contacting all Aircraft and telling them to secure their cockpit doors, even after we knew of cockpit intrusions, that the old hijacking paradigm was invalid, and we were in a panic of what other attacks were underway. FAA and the Airlines had the capability of providing this notice but didn't. (NOTE: This deserves more analysis and attention).

--Washington National ATC told Gofer 6 (C-130) to go look for flight 77.

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--On flight 93 one of the radio transmissions caught the terrorists telling the passengers: "They have our demands.!" He was playing up to the old hijacking paradigm of expected "negotiations" to keep the passengers/system/situation under control.

There is an ATA representative at Herndon

SPACE COMMAND is on the "hijack3" form for courier purposes only, no other reason.

FBI reviewed all FAA tapes on 9/12/01 by going to the source so that they could record everything digitally.

NOTES FROM LAB PRESENTATION

--Controller must rely on his/her memory of a flight once a contact drops from secondary to primary coverage on radar.

--122525: (8:25 am) First transmission received of Arabic voice uttering threatening words

--123445 (8:34 am) Controller overheard about calling OTIS to "scramble fighters"

--1238 (8:38 am) ATC asks 175 to look for flight AA11.

--1240 (8:40 am) You can hear supervisor talking to OTIS, on three different occasions beginning at about 8:34:45, FAA radar clock time.

--Cleveland Center was following UAL 93.

--1325 (9:25 am) --Flight 93 checks in -- OK.

--1329 (9:29 am) --ATC tries to verify altitude—No response.

--1332 (9:32 am)—Radio picks up threats from Arabic voice.

The FAA reconstruction tool is a UNIX-based system called SATORI. It is a legacy system that is being phased out in favor of a system called RAPTOR.

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--Ops Center (a.k.a.) Washington Operations Complex (WOC) is linked to the nine regional operations centers.

--The ACC (aviation control center)—used solely for aviation hijackings.

--FAA is now tied 24 hours a day by telephone to local law enforcement.

--Shirley Miller and Belger were ~~in the WOC the entire time.~~
on the 10th Floor, either in their office or in the WOC, throughout the day.

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--Garvey wasn't in the building when the events first started to unfold, ~~but once she~~
arrived she too spent her time either in her 10th Floor office or in the WOC.

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--Various centers activated on 9-11 Commission

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--Process for alerting system to trouble: ATC notifies SUPERVISOR; SUPERVISOR notifies REGIONAL OPS CENTER; REGIONAL OPS CENTER notifies FAA WASHINGTON OPERATIONS COMPLEX and Herndon Command Center. The airlines were notified by their representatives at Herndon, but they were also in contact with FAA Civil Aviation Security officials.

--The 9-11, "Phone Bridge" was set up by FAA. Lee Longmire, now at TSA, was in charge of 9/11 phone bridge.

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--There were two phone "NETS:," Primary Net: Linked everyone that was vital. Secondary Net: FAA Internal phone link.

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--FAA reports that most of the information about what happened that day was transferred to TSA, to NTSB or to the FBI.

--FAA reports that there was NO recording of the Phone Bridge.
(NOTE: Ken Mead says he heard in a meeting with the Sec./CoS Flaherty/Staff that there was a recording and that it was sent to DoJ).

--On 9/11 only the WOC was permanently staffed and only by two "Full-Performance Level" (FPL) officers per shift. Now both WOC and ACC are staffed 24 hours a day.

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| --New England/Eastern/Great Lakes: Regional offices that joined in the 9-11 Net.

| --Air Force Col. Adkins – Military liaison to the FAA on 9-11 and currently
(NOTE: Put on Interview list) Adkins arrived about an hour after FAA stood up for the crisis.

--Herndon Center manages the overall NAS—National Air Space; Linda Schyuessler or John White was on the phone with “Doug” from NORAD on the morning of 9/11.

| --Two FAA centers thought they might be targeted and sought to evacuate, including Boston and Pittsburgh. The evacuation order was countermanded by AT Control headquarters at the FAA.

--Shirley Miller was with Monte Belger and Jane Garvey all day on 9-11.

--Boston Center is located in Nashua, NH

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| --Someone in the meeting mentioned a “Domestic Event Network which grew out of the experience of 9/11 and includes TSA, ATC and regional operations centers

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FLIGHT 77

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--There are two ATC radar signatures for a contact: Primary: (which was just a blip/unidentified) and Secondary: (picks up alpha-numeric info from the transponder on the aircraft providing ID/Flight direction/Altitude/Airspeed.

--8:56 am FAA loses primary and secondary track from Flight AA77; Indianapolis Center tracking the flight: Indianapolis notifies Great Lakes (Chicago) of a possible accident of AA77; Great Lakes sends out a message to local law enforcement and others to look for a downed plane; the message goes to, among others, the Sheriff's office in Ashland, KY.

--FAA was told by a sheriff in Ashland, KY that 77 had crashed in Kentucky which was why they weren't looking for the flight. (The sheriff was responding based on request from ATC system for information on potential downed flight in that area and thus the FAA itself was the original source for the sheriff's report.)

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-- FAA stops looking for Flight AA77 because they think it's down in Kentucky.

--There was NO DISCUSSION on 9-11 of contacting all Aircraft and telling them to secure their cockpit doors, even after we knew of cockpit intrusions, that the old hijacking paradigm was invalid, and we were in a panic of what other attacks were underway. FAA and the Airlines had the capability of providing this notice but didn't. (NOTE: This deserves more analysis and attention).

-- Meanwhile, between 9:24 and 9:30 am controllers at Dulles observe fast moving primary targets.

-- At 9:33 am an ATC supervisor at Dulles calls the US Secret Service AND National Airport and informs them of fast moving target; Dave at Air Traffic opens a phone bridge (??)

-- At 9:36 am DCA ATC asks C-130 to go look for flight 77; it does.

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FLIGHT 93

--On flight 93 one of the radio transmission caught the terrorists telling the passengers:

"They have our demands!" He was playing up to the old hijacking paradigm of expected "negotiations" to keep the passengers/system/situation under control.

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MISCELLANEOUS

There is an ATA representative at Herndon

SPACE COMMAND is on the "hijack3" form for courier puposes only, no other reason.

FBI reviewed all FAA tapes on 9/12/01 by going to the the source so that they could record everything digitally.

FAA/ATC operations clocks and radar tracking clocks are synchronized, but command center clocks are not (thus the more reliable timing indicators come from the first two sources).

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Betty Swope

From: Stephanie Kaplan [skaplan@9-11commission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2003 8:01 AM
To: Staff; Commissioners
Subject: Press Clips for June 12, 2003

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

Press Clips for June 12, 2003

HEADLINES

- 1) Lingering Questions (Newsweek)
- 2) German Seen as Having Key Al Qaeda Role (LAT)
- 3) U.S. Widens Checks at Foreign Ports (NYT)
- 4) Rumsfeld Urges NATO to Find Ways to Fight Terror (NYT)
- 5) 4 Arrested in Plot to Bomb Embassies and Resorts in Thailand (NYT)
- 6) Cell phones found in Saudi probe rigged to trigger bombs (AP)
- 7) Alleged self-styled "terrorist" arrested in US state of Washington (Agence France Presse)
- 8) ACLU holds convention as post-Sept. 11 interest in group surges (Philadelphia Inquirer)
- 9) Chechen women join terror's ranks (CSM)
- 10) Security: at what cost? (U.S. News & World Report)
- 11) Baggage Checkers Breach Security at LAX (LAT)
- 12) Airport Finds That More Screeners Are Questionable (WP)
- 13) New York FBI head to leave post (AP)

FULL-TEXT

1) Lingering Questions

By Mark Hosenball & Michael Isikoff
Newsweek

In a long-awaited, closed-door meeting, FBI director Robert Mueller ran into a buzz saw of criticism this week from irate family members of September 11 victims over the bureau's handling of a range of matters relating to the terror attacks.

6/12/2003

THE FBI PUT OUT A bland press release about the meeting on Tuesday, stating that Mueller sought to "personally answer questions" from the family members and "help them understand the FBI's ongoing role in preventing and investigating acts of terrorism."

But family members who attended the meeting at the J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington told NEWSWEEK the meeting quickly grew contentious as soon as bureau officials finished the inevitable PowerPoint presentation on the status of the 9-11 probe. Many of those present were visibly annoyed with Mueller's responses--especially over his refusal to commit to holding any bureau officials accountable for intelligence failures that preceded the attacks.

"A lot of family members were angry, and there was a lot of shouting out of turn," said Steve Push, the leader of one of the 9-11 victims'-family groups. "There was a lot of unhappiness with quite a few of the responses."

Much of the stiffest criticism came from "the Jersey Girls"--a group of feisty young widows from northern New Jersey whose husbands died in the World Trade Center and who have become increasingly radicalized by what they view as the U.S. government's failure to provide them with answers to many key questions about the attacks.

The women from New Jersey got especially frustrated when Mueller and other top bureau officials at the meeting repeatedly brushed aside their questions, saying they couldn't respond because the answers might jeopardize the Justice Department's pending case against Zacarias Moussaoui, the accused Al Qaeda terrorist who is facing charges that he was a co-conspirator in the 9-11 attacks.

"I don't give a rat's a-- about Moussaoui!" said Patty Casazza, a 38-year-old New Jersey resident whose husband, John, died in the World Trade Center's north tower. "Send him to Guantanamo Bay and ... get what you can from him there."

Another key issue for the Jersey widows--who peppered Mueller with questions throughout the session and sometimes interrupted his responses--is accountability. Kristin Breitweiser, 32, pressed to know why bureau officials had not put together information from the so-called Phoenix memo--a July 2001 communiqué from a Phoenix-based FBI agent reporting that a suspiciously large number of Middle Eastern men were enrolling in U.S. flight schools--with information from the FBI's Minneapolis office the following month about the detention of one flight-school student in particular, Moussaoui.

When Mueller responded that, because of past problems with the FBI's computer system, only one junior analyst had access to reports on both matters in the summer of 2001, Breitweiser demanded to know whether she was disciplined for

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her failure to realize the significance of the intelligence and call the matter to the attention of higher ups.

Mueller grew indignant, according to some of those present. "If you want me to fire some 24-year-old woman who didn't have tools to know what to do ... I will not do it," he told the group.

"Fire her! Fire her!" some of those present shouted out.

Breitweiser said the family members didn't mean to be insensitive. But many did feel that the bureau should at least reassign the analyst. More broadly, family members say they are sickened by the fact that nearly two years after the attacks, no one in the U.S. government--neither at the FBI, CIA nor anywhere else--has been dismissed or otherwise disciplined for the multiple mistakes and intelligence foul-ups that preceded the attacks.

"I don't think he understands we're done with there being no accountability for what happened to our loved ones," said Lorie Van Auken, 48, another one of the Jersey group, whose husband, Kenneth, died in the attacks.

Mueller largely "kept his cool" throughout the meeting, according to Push. And in meeting with the family members, the FBI director has gone further than many others in the U.S. government in reaching out to the victims. ("In any meeting, you're going to have some people who are happy and some people who aren't," said FBI spokesman Bill Carter.) But the questions the family members are raising--about what the U.S. government knew prior to the attacks and what it has learned since--are not likely to go away.

A national commission investigating 9-11 is beset with tension, according to knowledgeable sources, and there is considerable debate as to whether the panel will ever get access to key White House documents in time to prepare its report due out next year. In the meantime, the Jersey widows say they have no intention of letting the matter rest.

"We're anxious," said Casazza. "And we want answers."

ANOTHER HYPED WMD REPORT?

Even as the debate intensifies over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, new questions are being raised about whether the Bush administration is hyping intelligence about the threat of an Al Qaeda attack using chemical, biological or radiological weapons.

A U.S. report submitted to the United Nations Security Council and released over

6/12/2003